China's relations with neighbouring countries, especially those with which it disputes territories in the South China Sea, dominated China's security outlook in the second half of 2011. With the United States openly re-engaging militarily with South East Asia, Beijing was faced with the conundrum of how to satisfy domestic audiences by forcefully pressing China's territorial claims, while trying internationally to cast off the label of regional bully attached to it by countries like the Philippines and Vietnam.
In terms of military diplomacy, the rhetoric used by China's leaders has failed to allay regional concerns. Their insistence that China's defence strategy is 'purely defensive in nature' became less credible when the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) began sea trials in August of its first aircraft carrier -- a capability with no obvious defensive utility. Claims by the Philippines and Vietnam that Chinese vessels had broken the 2005 Declaration of Conduct (DOC) governing behaviour in contested areas of the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, in mid-2011 further reinforced the impression that China was starting to act aggressively towards its smaller neighbours.
However, by late 2011 the PLA was pushing back with regional diplomatic efforts intended to portray the Chinese military in a more favourable light, energetically assisting with disaster relief operations in Pakistan and Thailand, for example. Tensions in the South China Sea had also reduced by then. After China and ASEAN agreed new DOC guidelines in July 2011, Beijing embarked on high-level efforts to repair its relationships with Manila and Hanoi, hosting Philippine President Benigno Aquino for talks in September and Vietnamese Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong in October. Yet, while the crisis of mid-2011 has abated, it will take time for some South East Asian countries to trust China fully.
China-ASEAN relations were again tested in early October, however, when 13 Chinese sailors were murdered while navigating through the Golden Triangle area of the Mekong river. Nine Thai soldiers were later charged with the killings. In response to huge public pressure in China, the governments of Burma, Laos and Thailand -- the three countries which meet in the Golden Triangle -- agreed to joint patrols of the upper Mekong with Chinese assistance. As of November, Chinese police boats were assisting with patrols as a temporary measure, and discussions about the establishment of a joint standing patrol force with perhaps 1,000 personnel were underway.
Cyber attacks launched from within China, and suspected (without clear proof) of having occurred with official backing, raised further questions about the country's status as a leading international stakeholder. In October, it emerged that one such cyber attack against Japan's largest defence company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in August, resulted in the theft of data relating to Japanese fighter aircraft and nuclear power plants. In November, the US Department of Defence unveiled its new cyber strategy, inspired in no small part by the US's belief that China has developed an advanced cyber warfare capability.
However, the final quarter of 2011 did not see the debut of any more high-profile military systems, such as the PLA Navy aircraft carrier or the J-20 stealth fighter, both of which broke into the public domain earlier in the year. In October, it was confirmed that China was continuing to order Russian AL-31 aircraft engines: it has now bought 1,000 of the engines, and ordered 270 of them earlier in 2011. This news was significant because it underlined the continuing problems of China's defence-industrial base to produce world-class systems in some technology disciplines, aircraft engines among them.
China was making more conspicuous technology breakthroughs with its space programme, launching the Tiangong-1 space lab in late September in the latest in a series of project milestones. In November, China also successfully put the 12th satellite in its Yaogan constellation of military reconnaissance satellites into orbit. China maintains that it opposes the militarisation of space, and other countries are warily watching the country's impressive progress in the space field.
Domestically, the Chinese authorities continued to deal with sporadic protests and riots, generally staged by local people upset about land confiscations. Protests were seen in Lufeng, Guangdong, in September, for example. More serious was the spate of self-immolations by Tibetan monks protesting against Chinese rule. Between March and November 2011, 11 Tibetans had set themselves on fire, six of whom subsequently died. Their protests raise the likelihood of a more widespread challenge to Beijing's rule in 2012. Xinjiang, China's other restive western province, also remained tense after 14 people died in riots there in July. Separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang remain the most significant threat to China's internal security, alongside the economic uncertainty that China faces in the event of a double-dip recession in the West.
Click for Report details:China Defence and Security Report Q1 2012
